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The recent consumer dissatisfaction with food supplies in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe points out both the success and
the failure of the last two decades' agricultural policies.

On

the successful side, output has risen more than 40 pe cent between
1960 and 1978, with the highest success in Hungary,
production grew by more than 80 percent.
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here grain

On the ot

these achievements took place only with rapidly risi
which increased more than 50 percent during the same period.
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This resulted in a price-cost squeeze familiar tous all, but the
socialist governments uniformly chose to subsidize t e agricultural. sector and keep the price of food low.

Thus c nsumers

wanted more. food that could be provided only by incr asing the
subsidies and their fisca-1 burden.
This policy dilemma, between increasing food su sidies or
food prices, is a familiar predicament that accompan es economic
development and its politics.

Politically, the prob em can be

seen as a conflict between the politics of distribut on and the
.

politics of production.
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l

In distribution politics,

he interest

of urban consumers in low food prices directly oppos s the interest of rural workers in increased income.

In the So iet Union

and Eastern Europe, subsidies from the state budget

ave resolved

this conflict.

he income

Income has risen in rural areas and

differential between the city and countryside dimini hed.

In

. Romania for the first time, an average farmer now ea ns more
income than his (or her) urban counterpart.
of food in cities is low.
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Still, the price

2

Despite the timeliness of these dj,.stributive consequences,
it is the politics of production that are of concern here.

Agri-

cultural production requires above all an abundant supply of
land, and in East Europe this basic material resource is subject
to stringent political controls.

Most stringent is the control

C

of land in the Soviet Union where land ownership is nationalized,
but other Eastern European countries differ only nominally.
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In

an important sense, the public ownership· and control of agricuJ:-'
/

tural land solved a problem in the politics of distribution because it abolished the landowning class and its wealth entitlements and limited its earnings to those from labor.

Nevertheless,

this new form of ownership created some previously unexplored
problems in the politics of.production !)ecause it abolished the
landowner as a decisionmaker and replaced him with a planner.
The decisionmaker in socialist agriculture is a political
part of production.

The decisions include the additions to

capital equipment (and its financing from taxes or retained
earnings), the optimum size of farm, the appropriate organization
of farm producers and the proper allocation of land between uses,
e.g., between corn and cotton, or between cropland and urban
housing ..
ship.

These decisions are Political because of state owner-

Although all of them have potentially identifiable conse-

quences for the continued growth of agricultural output, only
the decisions regarding land use and its evaluation wili be
discussed here.

The methods are hew and impinge on many of the

other policies proposed for agricultural growth.

For example,

3

David Schoonover has suggested that-the best hopes for agricultural growth in the Soviet Union come from more specialization
and concentration in production.
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If so-, implementing these poli-

cies will require the more efficient land-use information.
An. incentive for a closer examination of land use and an
extended. search for new methods of valuation is the declining
ratio of arable land per capita, i .,e. , less land must feed more.
people.

In Poland, for: example, the -arable land per person in

1_970 was only 80 percent o-f its level in 1955.

7 -This does not

mean that the land_ pe-r agricultural worker· also was falling, for
indeed i t has risen in Ea.stern Europe because new mechSrnical
technology allows a worker to farm more land; Poland is-the only
exception.

8

It does mean, however, that agricultural land no

,longer can be viewed simply as a gift from nature that is limit-:
less or "free_," - but must be seen as a resource that is increas- ingly scarce and whose use must be hoarded.
The hoarding, or economizing, of land use is accomplished
most clearly by a land price with a mechanism like a market to
transfer use and users by a money exchange.
reasons

Largely for Marxist

(often associated with the politics of distribution),

this has not been a socialist policy.

Eve~ in Po1and, where

the ownership of agricultural land is ostensibly "private,"
its transfer is effectively limited to inheritance only and if
there is no direct heir the land reverts to collective owner.

s h J.p.
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Nevertheless, land may be given a "shadow price" that

reflects roughly the price that a market exchange would have

4

reached if it had happened~

Shadow pricing is a common tool in

the economic analysis of public projects in market systems.

Al-

though one noted practitioner believes that the concept is inappropriate -to socialism, his belief seems unjustified because
1.

t f ai'l s t o consi. -d er its
·
lO
use t h ere.

In effect, a shadow price

sums pieces of information already in the s;ystem with explicit
weights, and its economic environment need not be limited to one
kind of exchange or ownership.

A similar belief can be found in

the USSR, where s.cholars dispute whether a constructed land value
should be entered as. an accounting cost to the farm or should
only be used in planning decisions.
One step toward. a socialist shadow price occurred with the
recognition that land of higher quality creates a rent for its
user, with the consequence that equal farm workers may re_cei ve
unequal incomes depending only on the quality of the soil.

One

scholar in the Ukraine has estimated that the difference in income that was unrelated to work effort has risen as high as 100
percent.
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In resolving this problem, the land rent was not made

explicit nor was it attached to the land, but was deducted from
the money prices paid to farmers for government purchases.
Prices were differentiated by procurement zones, a practice of
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
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The land rent implicit

in gross crop revenues is difficult to calculate exactly; too
high a rent extraction inadvertently will tax labor effort but
too low rent will create a subsidy, and distribution inequities.
Over time, the number of prices and zones has proliferated and
the differentials have become greater.
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5

Nonetheless, the zonal pricing of.crops reflects the politics
more of distribution than of production.

It gives to farmers no

new incentives to use good land for a more valuable crop; since
all land seems free, the price of the good land is the same as
for all others.
'
-

More important in a planned economy, the planner

se~s no differences in land value either and freely shifts productive farmland out of agriculture to factories; urban housing, airports, and hydroelectric dams.

Soviet economists have estimated

that the use of land in the irrational location of buildings loses
one billion rubles annually, at least 0.5 percent of the Net
Material Product.
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In fairness, this problem is not only that

of a pro-industry socialist planner.

Since good farmland includes

public investments (roads and such) that are valuable in industry
and housing, too, the best farmland often is converted to urban
use in private markets when the worst land with new roads would
have been equally useful and spared agricultural production as
well.

15
Treating land as "free" fails to acknowledge its value and

scarcity as a factor of production.

The omission is by no means

rare; e.g., input-output tables include only the factors of labor
and capital.

The omission of land is most misleading in the

analysis of agriculture where land looms so large and irreplaceable an input.

At the macroeconomic level, some shadow prices

have been suggested to account for land's imputed share of income.

Abram. Bergson, in estimating the Soviet national income

at factor cost, entered land at the same share of farm earnings
as the United States in 1946.
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More recently, some Soviet

6

authors have calculated a similar number and their result is surprisingly close to that of. Bergson.

Bergson estimated that 32

percent of farm earnings could be attributed to land in the Soviet
Union; Onishchenko estimated that the share in the Ukraine was 27
I

percent.
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These aggregate estimates are useful in macroeconomic

analysis, but do not assist at all the evaluations to be made at
the microeconomic level.
Establishing microeconomic land. values is an extraordinary·
undertaking.

The number of uses and users (actual and potential)

is surely inf"inite and the characteristics that make land valuable are undoubtedly numerous.

Nevertheless, the task was neces-

sary if only to .study the implied value in current decisions and
even if some simplifications were introduced.

In all of Eastern

Europe, the first step was an inventory.and registration of land
users and their holdings.
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Ordinarily this work was directed by

a faculty or institute of geography and is analogous to the land
title registration system that underlies all private ownership.
The measurement and legal description of land is highly regarded
19 A . 1
. d'1.spensa bl e to d eve 1.
. any economic
'
as 1.n
opment 1.n
sys t em.
eria
surveys have provided some considerable technical assistance in
this process.

Urban and industrial zones were treated separately.

In socialist systems, agricultural land registration, and

cadastral

survey, is accompanied by an analysis of soil and cli-

mate.

The taxonomy of agricultural zones is complex, as an ex2
ample from the Soviet cadastral survey will illustrate.
First,

°

the agricultural land is assigned to a "belt," based on temperature and described as cold, temperate, or warm.

Then it is

7

.assigned to one of fourteen "zones" bas~d on the balance of tem1

perature and water, and the prevailing soil type, such as the
"forest steppe" zone.

From this are defined 44 "provinces,"

with sub-zones based on microclimate (e.g., for early, middle,
or late maturing crops) and sub-provinces based on relief (level,
valley, mountainous).
category.)

(Five mountainous "oblasts" are a separate

This taxonomy established the agricultural zone-

pricing scheme mentioned above and is now more or less. complete-.
This complex taxonomy has been synthesized into a technical
value measured in units (ball), usually with a range of zero to
100 but occasionally with an open range..

Although a central

administration instruction imposes some common requirements, each
administrative sub-unit devises its own qualitative scale and
th ey vary w1'd e 1y. 21

The ball measures often are used in research

projects that require a land quality variable, e.g., in an analysis
.

of conditions for establishing an industrial complex.

22

Neverthe-

less, they have not been used as a land price in money terms.
The money valuation of Soviet land relies not on this vast
technical study and the cadastral taxonomy but on variants of
yield, or output per hectare valued at the prevailing price.
Decisions arise as to "which crops," "whose yield," and "what
price."

Again, the results show considerable local diversity.

Most administrative units choose their major crop to value their
land: food grain for people (a "wheat" unit) or feed grain for
animals (an "oat" unit).

Although some value land by the yield

of an experimental farm or hybrid seed producer, most use the

8

yield of an average producer as a numeraire.

The price to value

the yield (and to compare wheat units with oats) presents a difficult choice because all agricultural prices reflect inversely the
rent of the land that they are to value.
This circularity has encouraged a number of proposals .for
alternate land values, and three schools o_f thought will show
their diversity.

23

One school would value land by its revenues

per hectare, but this procedure draws the same criticism as
before, because revenues depend on the. zonal. prices.

A.second

school would value land by its cost per hectare for a given yield,
with the justification that land's value is its ability to save
other inputs, espe.cially labor.

Since "cost" in the Sovi_et eco-

nomy has several definitions, this measure has several complicated
versions~ there also is disagreement as to whether land itself is
a cost.

Finally, some propose that agricultural land should be

valued by the cost of its replacement, as in the clearing of
forest, the restoration of open mines, and- the like~
This last, the replacement concept of agricultural land
value, has the virtues of simplicity and reason.

It was first

proposed by G. P. Wibberley in:the United Kingdom and later
accepted in Eastern Europe.

24

Wibberley, concerned about the

vanishing of Britain's food supply as cities sprawled over the
best agricultural land, argued.that the market and the city
planners valued this land inappropriately and proposed a new
land value based on the concept of "food replacement," a simplified derived demand.

9

Food replacement, Wibberley argued, could come from several
sources, each giving a different value to the land lost to urban
sprawl.

First, the land itself could be replaced, and Wibberley

calculated value from the cost of reclaiming land from the sea,
from forests, from abandoned mineral works (gravel pits and open
mines).

The third school listed above uses such a measure for

valuing the land lost to large water projects.

Since all new

lands are at the extensive margin of production, Wibberley calculated. as well. the food. replacement cost of more intensive use of
existing farmland.

G. Szabo.has used such a concept in his valua-

tion of farmland in Hungary by fertilizer cost.

25

Finally,

Wibberley calculated the food replacement cost of new producers
on heretofore uncounted land:
and imported food from abroad.

householders in domestic gardens
Corresponding equivalents from

Eastern Europe have not been ~ubl ished

but surely exist impli-

ci tly ..
While land withdrawn from agricultural use may be given a
shadow price, its purchase and sale is a separable modification
26
and not universally accepted in Eastern Europe.
Probably the
first actually to require payment for the land withdrawn from
agricultural use was the German Democratic Republic in January
1968.

There the average price was 5000 marks per hectare (about

2.5 acres), and it was discounted by 25 percent if the new user

built roads or other public facilities.

In Poland, the average

price for arable land is 15 1 000 zlotys and it is differentiated
by fertility class.

Romania has no land price but the government
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imposes a "fine" or 5,000-50,000 lei (depending on land quality)
if anyone diminishes agricultural land in quantity or quality!
Although these price schemes influence the allocation of
agricultural larid between sectors, they do not necessarily guide.
planning within agriculture.

Some Eastern European countries

have introduced a. direct land rent for this purpose.

In the

German Democratic Republic, the maximum land rent is 300 marks
per hectare per year; the minimum- rent is actually a subsidy up
to 150 marks per hectare per year.

In. Poland, there isa land

tax resembling a rent that depends on soil fertility (6 classes)
and land us,e.

Other East European countries charge only an in-

direct land rent.

Czechoslovakia imposes an income tax on pro1

duction value: that exceeds 1500 kroner per hectare.
also imposes an income tax.

Bulgaria

The contribution to allocative effi-

ciency of these user charges is probably minuscule since a choice
of land use in re~pons~ to price often is not possible.
In the broader context of a whole economy, agricµltural
land has value not only for fertility and other· natural characteristics but for its location.

Unfortunately, none of these

shadow prices includ·e a location charge.

Since commercial pro-

duction requires transportation, an identical produc~ produced
in two locations will differ in value when one requires less
transport than the other.

This difference in product price can

.
.
.
27
be attributed to the value of location
in
a 1 an d price.

As the specialization and concentration of production increase the output of Soviet agriculture, a shadow price for land

11

location·becomes more important.

Although the data from the Soviet

cadastral survey are not available (and would be unwieldy if they
were), they were roughly approximated for this study.

Research

in several e~onomies worldwide shows that the effect of location
on land price is substantial, but has considerable stability.

28

From this observation, a shadow price. for Soviet land by republics
and economic·raions was constructed.

Assuming that transport is

the source of location. value, it was defined as a function of popu-·
lation density, following the widely used sociological maxim that
interaction (i.e., transport) is proportional to density.

29

This

constructed price then was compared to one derived in the Soviet
Union from land clearance costs and revenues.

30

The two price

series were found to be highly correlated, preserving a lexicographic ordering for the most part~

(For reference, they are

shown in a table at. the end of the paper.)
The correlation between the two price series. constructed
from very different.characteristics indicates some macroeconomic
and

success in valuing agricultural/land including ah implicit location charge.

Unfortunately, microeconomic success cannot be

similarly documented until the data are more refined.
ago, an American geographer wrote of the Soviet Union:

A

decade
"Wanted:.

'
'
" 31 . Th is
. nee d remains
.
. d ispens.
Lan d Use Po 1 icy....
in
An E ff ective
able for expanding the East European food supply today.

The

scholarly work there on rational land prices has been impressive.
It remains to be seen if it has contributed to the nearlyintractable problems of the politics of production.
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vlozhenii,

Table 1:

Simulated prices for agricultural land, Soviet Union,
Rep.ublics and Economic Raions of the- RFSFR, 1970.
Method_

Method 2
rubles per hectare

USSR

800

1,300

Northwest
Centra 1
Volga Vyatski i
Central ~lackearth
Povolzh'ya

450
500
450,
750
450

850·
1,600_
1 , 150
1,450
850

North Caucasus
Urals
East Siberia
West Si'beria
Far Ea.st

950
450
600
300.

1,300
750
450
300
350

Ukraine,

1,600

2,250

Belorussia

1-,.000

1,950

Kazakhstan

150

, 200

1,200

2,400

900

1,500

Lithuania

1,000

2,200

Moldavia

2,500 -

3, 150

Latvia

900

1,850

Kirghiz

400

, 650

Tadjrkistan

900

1,050

1,400

2,200

150

.200

1,200

1 ,800

RFSFR

Georgia
Azerbaidjan

Armenia
Turkmenistan
Estonia
Sources:

JOO

Method l: M.M. Loiter, Prirodnye resursy
effektivnost'
kapital 'nykh vlozheni i, lzdat Nauka, Moscow, 1974, p. 162-3.
Method 2~ Narodnoe Khoziaistvo v USSR 1970, Moscow, 1971
and. calculations by author.

